Introduction
Exchange rate management is a crucial component of macroeconomic policy. Since the postwar period, there has been a long-term debate over the merits of fixed versus floating exchange rates.
The 1997-98 Asian crises have refocused attention on exchange rate management of East Asian countries. Most views expressed are critical of the pre-crisis US dollar peg regime, citing it as a cause of the crisis. It is said that this regime caused the appreciation of real effective exchange rates (REER) and the subsequent loss of competitiveness.
This article evaluates the pre-crisis US dollar peg regime in the selected East Asian countries by examining its negative effect on trade balance through currency appreciation. Specifically, the two main questions are these: whether the dollar peg system did, in fact, cause appreciation of REER in the pre-crisis East Asian countries, and, if it did, how badly the appreciation of REER affected trade balance in those countries. The strategic implication of our findings is how impor tant the stabilizing of REER is in exchange rate management.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous studies and assess ments of the pre-crisis regimes in the East Asian countries. Section 3 describes empirical studies, In this section, we briefly review the previous studies and assessments of the pre-crisis exchange rate regimes in the East Asian countries. First, we review the analyses of the pre-crisis de facto exchange rate regime: the dollar peg regime. Second, we show the general assessments of the precrisis dollar peg regime from the viewpoint of its effect on trade balance before the Asian crisis .
Third, we focus on recent studies of the pre-crisis trend of the REER and of the relationship between the REER and trade balance.
De Facto Exchange Rate Regime
The IMF classification of exchange rate arrangements did not necessarily reflect actual exchange rate management, since it was based on member countries' formally announced regimes .
For example, the pre-crisis exchange rate arrangements of Indonesia , Korea, and Malaysia were classified as "Managed Float," for the Philippines it was "Independent Float ," and for Thailand the classification was "Pegged to Currency Composite," although all of them appeared to have adopted dollar peg regimes.
Frankel and Wei (1994) and Kawai (1997) The international organizations also comment on the pre-crisis dollar peg system as follows.
The World Bank (1998) stated that in most of the ASEAN countries, the dollar pegged currencies lost competitiveness against the important yen market because the yen depreciated against the US dollar throughout much of 1996. The ADB (1998) explained that the pegged exchange rate contributed to current account deficits and rising real exchange rates, the combination of which provided a vital ingredient of the financial crisis. They attributed the rising real rate to a combina tion of factors that included higher domestic inflation in relation to the world average; appreciation of the US dollar, to which these currencies were pegged; depreciation of the Japanese yen; and devaluation of the PRC currency in 1994. We focus on recent studies of the pre-crisis trend of the REER and on the relationship between the REER and trade balance. In looking at the REER trend, several studies have examined the validity of the purchasing power parity (PPP) hypothesis, which is equivalent to the constancy of the REER.1 Hataiseree (1995), through co-integration analysis, provided no evidence in support of a long-run equilibrium relationship between bilateral nominal exchange rates for the Thai baht and the currencies of Thailand's major trading partners, thereby rejecting PPP. This implied that considerable care should be taken in assessing the long-run implications for the real exchange rate.
Khoon and Mithani (2000) presented an empirical test of PPP applied to the Malaysian ringgit for the pre-crisis period. It detected that real exchange rate follows a random walk, contrary to the expectations of PPP equilibrium.
Looking at the relationship between the REER and trade balance, the movement of REER, in We now turn to empirical analyses of the selected East Asian countries . Here we focus, as sample countries, on the hardest-hit countries among the East Asian countries: Indonesia , Korea, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand.
There are three steps in our analyses. First, we examine the trend of real effective exchange rates (REER) for the sample countries during the pre-crisis period, considering its relation to the US dollar peg regime. Second, we conduct a regression analysis to verify the relationship between REER and trade balance during the pre-crisis period. Third , we conduct a simulation analysis of trade balance with the assumption that the sample countries had adopted a policy to stabilize REER instead of the de facto US dollar peg system during the pre-crisis period . We can then examine the negative effect of REER appreciation on trade balances.
All data used throughout the empirical studies come from the IFS of the IMF (IMF 2002) . We 2 Much of trade theory , including the factor-proportions theory associated with Heckscher and Ohlin, focuses on the underlying reasons for international trade, with relatively limited discussion of the role of exchange rates either in determining or being determined by trade. In contrast to that, exchange rates have played a central role in estimated equations for trade volumes (See Ito, Isard, Symansky, and Bayoumi (1996).). Taguchi (1998) focus on the estimation for trade-exchange rate relation ship of selected East Asian countries. Kim and Lee (1996) dealt with the issue on the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade in the Korean case.
use IFS annual data for the regression and simulation analyses considering data availability, the sample period for which is from 1960 to 1996 (For Indonesia, the sample period is from 1971 to 1996 due to a constraint on data). We exclude the period after 1997 because of macroeconomic turbu lence during the financial crisis.
Real Effective Exchange Rate Trends
We start by looking at the REER trends in the sample countries and examining whether the pre-crisis dollar peg system caused appreciation of the REER.
The REER is an indicator of a country's international price competitiveness, specifically of a country's prices relative to those of other countries. Therefore, a country's REER levels off when an exchange rate is fully adjusted according to a country's prices relative to those of other countries Table 2 , the REER shows a clear trend of 10-40 percent apprecia tion during the pre-crisis period of 1987-96. There seem to be at least two reasons for this significantly large appreciation of REER. First, when the sample countries peg their currencies to 1) The lag truncation is one quarter in the ADF test , and three quarters in the PP test.
2) ***,**, and * indicate rejection of the null of nonstationarity at the 1 percent , 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels with critial values taken from Davidson and Mackinnon (1993 We finally turn to a simulation analysis to examine how and to what extent the sample countries would have changed their trade balance trend if they had adopted a policy to stabilize their REER instead of the de facto US dollar peg system during the pre-crisis period. We here exclude Indonesia and Malaysia from the simulation analysis because we could not verify the relationship between its REER and trade balance in the regression analysis of the previous section.
We proceed to the simulation analysis in the following way. First, we materialize the policy to stabilize the REER in such a way that the REER levels off from 1987 to 1996. Second, we We can therefore conclude that the negative effect of the REER appreciation on external balance was large enough to be considered as one of the causes of the currency crisis since 1997.
The simulation analysis above clearly shows the importance of stabilizing the REER in exchange rate management as a policy implication. The US dollar peg system, as analyzed in Section 3.1, had inherently caused the REER appreciation. Then, the question is: what kinds of Source: IFS (IMF) Figure 2 . The Effect of REER Appreciation on External Balance alternative system for exchange rate management can achieve a stable REER . When we consider that both inflation differentials and the depreciation of third countries under the dollar peg regime are key factors for currency appreciation, both the inflation slide and basket pegging in exchange rate management seem to be inevitable for the REER stabilization.
Concluding Remarks
In this study we set out to examine, using empirical studies (Section 3) , the negative effect of the pre-crisis US dollar peg regime on trade balance through currency appreciation in selected East
Asian countries.
First, we found a significantly large appreciation of real effective exchange rate in the pre-crisis East Asian sample countries with de facto dollar peg regimes. Second, we verified the correlation between real effective exchange rate and trade balance by regression analysis. Third, the simula tion results indicated that the appreciation of real effective exchange rate had a clearly negative effect on trade balance. Therefore, our studies imply the importance of stabilizing real effective exchange rate in exchange rate management.
Other analytical issues remain. First, we may improve the simulation method by considering the "general impact" of the changes of exchange rate policies on macroeconomic variables . This paper considers only the "partial impact" on trade balance. Change of exchange rate management, however, may simultaneously influence such domestic economic variables as GDP and coefficients on the REEK. Second, the post-crisis trends of the REER and trade balance are an important frontier to be studied. The post-crisis period is, up to now, a little too short to provide sufficient data for sophisticated analyses.
We will, therefore, need to keep track of upcoming trends in the relevant economic indices and policies.
